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JOHN RICHARDS: This session will focus on international patent
development. It's going to have a significant pharma aspect to it. We have a
number of very eminent persons from England speaking, also contributions
from Germany and Brazil. It's going to be an interesting session, I think. First
of all, we have Sir Robin Jacob, retired Lord Justice of Appeal in England who
is going to tell us about the problems of getting patents on new uses of old drugs.
Robin?
ROBIN JACOB: Okay. Right. I want to talk about a problem which I
think is a very serious problem about the limits of the patent system. To a doctor,
a new found use for an old substance, particularly an old medicine, is for all
practical purposes, a new medicine. If he can treat something which he couldn't
treat before or treat it better, he's got an import new medicine. Patent law regards
that which has gone before as old and unpatentable and, in its basic form which
used to be the law in England, that was the end of it. You've got no right in a
thing itself just because you found a new use for
The European Patent Office has created a fudge for that in the European
system–that you can patent the old thing for a new medical use by saying it's for
something new. You pretend that which is old has suddenly become new.
It's not a satisfactory fudge. First of all, there is the problem of a
defendant who is selling it only for the old purpose. Doctors and others may
still, nonetheless, use it for the new purpose because they know it can be used
for the new purpose. In some countries where you have to pay for it yourself,
they may say, “Well, the patient can't afford the patented price so I will prescribe
it all the same and they will be able to buy the generic version.” In Europe, you
can't patent a method of medical treatment itself with the old medicine–that's
not allowed. That's considered a very bad thing indeed, although, I've never
understood why. In America, you can, but the problem remains the same.
What you want is two different prices, one for the new use and one for
the old use. Patent law doesn't do it very well at all. We had cases in Europe,
the pregabalin case,1 where the Supreme Court in effect aligned itself pretty
closely to Germany which said, “Well, unless the defendant is selling it for the
new use, it isn't for the new use.” Which is obvious nonsense, if, in fact, it is
going to be used for the new use. There are cases where the only use will be the
new use. It looks to me, and I'll be very grateful for people's views on this, there
are limits to what the patent system can do here.
That has profound implications, notwithstanding the brigade that says,
“Oh, patents for medicines are a bad thing, it's been keeping prices up,” and so
on and so forth. This is a living example of the fact that if you can't get a patent
for things, people don't do nearly as much research as they could do and would

1
Warner-Lambert Company LLC v. Generics (UK) Ltd t/a Mylan and another [2018]
UKSC 56 (Eng.).
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do–not least because the amount of research you need to establish a new use for
an old medicine, and all the regulatory requirements, is a very different order.
You no longer go into safety and side effects. You know about all those
because the old use established all those. You only have to establish it works.
It's cheaper, it's faster, and there are a whole lot of practical new uses for old
medicines out there not being researched because patentees can't get proper
protection. Is there another solution?
Can regulatory systems somehow deal with it? Well, up to a point
possibly. Regulatory systems aren’t there to provide monopolies. Monopolies
may be an incidental effect however. Thus, if only one company has regulatory
approval for sale of a known medicine for a new use there could be some
monopoly effect.
But what's to be done properly? Well, the best I've been able to devise
is that the payers should be required to find out how much is used for the new
and how much is used for the old. When I say the payers, in my country it would
be the National Health Service. In many other countries, it would be insurance
companies. They should be paying different prices according to whether it was
for the new use or the old use. One way of finding out what medicines were
actually used for, would be from prescriptions.
Now, certainly, that raises a whole bunch of problems. It's actually very
desirable that prescriptions do say what that medicine is being prescribed for.
They do it in one or two countries. Denmark, I think. Because then you can get
all sorts of interesting data as a result of finding out what happened to the
patients on a collective basis.
Then you will find people saying, “Oh, it's a great infringement to
people's liberties to know what a patient is getting the medicine for.” Of course,
the pharmacist will know in most cases all those of medicines have only one
use. I believe the objection to be overstated but what I'm really putting forward
to you here is that our beloved patent system designed to promote innovation
has its limitations. We've got to find ways of promoting industrial research to
get around the limitations of patent law itself. It's most important in the field of
new uses for old medicines. I stop here, within time.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you, Robin. Does anybody on the panel want
to pick up Robin's challenge? Of course, in this country, we're still waiting for
the Federal Circuit to come down as to whether the sale of a drug within the
scope of a skinny label can be an infringement of a patent, which relates to the
stuff which is outside that skinny label.2 We'll see what the Federal Circuit does
with that very shortly. Any comments from anybody else? No?
ROBIN JACOB: Seems none.
JOHN RICHARDS: You've stunned everybody Robin, as usual. Thank
you. Our next speaker is Christopher Floyd who together with Lord Hoffmann,
who's going to follow him, will address the Regeneron3 decision of the UK
Supreme Court, which certainly stunned me when it came down. Maybe, I'll get
better clarification as to what it was all about and why we needed it or did not
need it. Thank you, Christopher.
CHRISTOPHER FLOYD: Thank you, John. In June 2020, the Supreme
Court in the UK handed down the Regeneron v Kymab decision. It was, by that
stage, common ground that Regeneron had made a groundbreaking invention,
2
3

GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v. Kymab Ltd [2020] UKSC 27 (Eng.).
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which solved a significant problem in the production of therapeutic antibodies
for human pharmaceutical use.
Just a bit of background, it was well-known that therapeutic antibodies
could be produced from mice by insertion of genes into the murine genetic code.
The insertion of those genes, however, led to a reduced immunological response
which they called, in the art, immunological sickness of the mice. Regeneron's
solution was to insert a hybrid gene structure consisting of murine constant
regions and human variable regions. This is called the reverse chimeric locus
and the claim for present purposes can be taken as the claim for the mice with a
reverse chimeric locus. Amongst a whole host of attacks launched by Kymab,
there was only one which succeeded, and it arose from the fact that, at the
relevant date, gene insertion could be achieved only with a small part, and by
no means the whole of the human variable region.
The Supreme Court held, by a majority of 4 to 1, reversing the Court of
Appeal, that the patent was invalid for insufficiency because the invention could
not be performed across the entire range of potential inserts, which fell within
the scope of the claim. I need to declare an interest because I was a party to the
decision of the Court of Appeal in that case.
The Supreme Court founded its decision on seven propositions which
I'll take fairly rapidly.
First, the requirement for sufficiency exists to ensure that the patentee's
monopoly corresponds to his contribution to the art. Two, in the case of a claim
to a product, the contribution to the art is the product rather than, they say, the
invention. Thirdly, the disclosure required of the patentee must be sufficient to
enable the skilled person to make substantially all the types or embodiments of
products within the scope of the claim. Fourthly, the above principles are subject
only to de minimis exceptions. Fifthly, the patentee doesn't have to demonstrate
that everything within the scope of the claim has been tried and tested. He can
rely on a principle of general application to make a prediction, but he takes the
risk that, when challenged, an opponent will be able to show that some
embodiments cannot in fact be made. Sixthly, a claim will not be defeated on
this principle by dividing the claim into a range denominated by some wholly
irrelevant feature. The requirement to show sufficiency of a range only applies
to a relevant range, not an irrelevant one. I shall come back to that in a moment.
Seventhly, enablement is not shown by a demonstration that all the claimed
products will show the claimed benefit if they can be made. The Supreme Court
held, applying these principles, that the size of the insert was a relevant range,
claiming everything from a minimal insert all the way up to the whole of the
human variable region. Therefore, the patent was invalid. In other words, well
done, Regeneron. A pat on the head, but not good enough—you haven't
invented enough.
It's fair to say, coming from where I do come, that I don't agree with that
reasoning. It's true that in the case of some objections to the validity of a patent,
it's a correct proposition to say that everything that falls within the scope of
protection of the claim has to fulfil that particular requirement. It's often said
that anything which is an infringement must be novel and non-obvious. There's
no de minimis or indeed any other exception to that rule. If the claims are wide
enough to encompass just one thing which was old or obvious, it is invalid.
But you simply can’t apply that approach to the objection of
insufficiency. The requirement that you must enable everything which falls
4
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within the scope of the claim isn't just subject to de minimis exception. It's
extremely well established that the claimant can cover improvements which are
inventive, and that fact alone does not render the patent insufficient. Sometimes,
the defendant will say, “Well, I've got a very clever infringement and you don't
teach how to do that.” But that doesn't give rise to the objection of insufficiency.
There's a very large exception to the principle that an invention must be enabled
all the way across the scope of the claim.
Now, the problem is in defining how big is that exception. The Supreme
Court correctly identified that some types of non-enabled embodiments were
relevant and some irrelevant. As the Court said, no one would say that the claim
should fail because the claim includes mice with very short tails but fails to
disclose how to make such mice. 4 Of course, that's an advocate's extreme
example designed to elicit the response: "Of course not." Where is the line to be
drawn in a case like this? The very notion of relevant and irrelevant features
begs the question. Relevant to what?
The Court thought that the length of the insert was relevant because
longer was better. They pointed to the fact it took many years after the invention
for the reverse chimeric locus to be deployed in a situation where the whole of
the human variable section was inserted. Lord Briggs describes the inability to
do this at a priority date as “the inventive shortfall”5 and “a shortcoming in the
invention.”6
But why should any of that be treated as relevant when the novel and
inventive idea of the reverse chimeric locus could be made at the priority date,
albeit with a short insert? The ability to deploy the invention in more
challenging circumstances was not a shortfall or shortcoming of the invention.
The length of the insert was not a component of the invention at all. To my
mind, the correct approach is to ask whether the feature, which is said to make
the claim insufficient, is relevant to the patentee’s contribution to the art or the
inventive concept. Anything else is truly as irrelevant just as is the length of the
mouse's tail.
One can make this final point that despite their adoption, as their first
principle, that the requirement of sufficiency is to ensure that the patentee gets
the protection which corresponds to his contribution to the art. The Court's
decision results in a scope of monopoly narrower than the contribution to the
art. All an infringer has to do, in order to make use of the Regeneron invention,
is make a slightly longer insert. Despite the fact that he's making use of the
inventive idea, he can do so for free.
JOHN RICHARDS: We're back to the contribution made by the patent
owner and Lord Hoffmann in Biogen v. Medeva7 from I'm not sure how long
ago. There's a question which arises, where if you have a very broad claim
deemed to be enabled and further invention is required to get that invention
operable in some parts of that broad coverage, whether the original owner or the
original inventor should be entitled to stop the subsequent improvement or just
have to pay for it in some way? Which brings us back to our question on
injunctions earlier on but anyway, Lord Hoffman.

4

Id. at [21].
Id. at [46].
6
Id.
7
Biogen Inc v. Medeva Plc [1997] RPC 1 (Eng.).
5
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LENNIE HOFFMANN: Thank you, Christopher, for telling me what the
case was about because I'm also going to talk about the same case. My message
is that the Supreme Court got the answer entirely wrong. But we don't have to
worry about that because they didn't get the law wrong. What they did was
misconstrue the claims. Now, it appears that the mouse DNA, which codes for
the relevant antibodies that they were trying to make, consists of two chains
called constant regions and variable regions. Before the priority date, people
have been trying to swap as much as they could of human DNA in substitution
for the various chains in the mouse DNA.
What the inventor discovered was that if you left the mouse with its
constant regions untouched, then you could change as much as you like of the
variable regions, and the mouse wouldn't suffer any immunological damage as
a result. Previous to that, mice were, as a result of these changes, becoming what
was called immunologically sick and they didn't work very well. The invention,
therefore, was to say, leave the mouse with the constant chains. If you can do
that, you can change as much as you like of the variable ones.
Now, the claim, therefore, was, and I'll read it, “A transgenic mouse that
produces hybrid antibodies containing human variable regions and mouse
constant regions," and then these are the critical words, “wherein said mouse
comprises an in situ replacement of mouse [variable] regions with human
[variable] regions.”8 The mouse had to produce hybrid human and mouse
antibodies but with only the variable regions having been replaced in the mouse.
Now, how much of the variable regions did the invention contemplate
would be replaced? There appeared on the face of this to be agreement between
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. They both said it meant "all or
any"9 of the variable regions. The evidence was that if the object of the exercise
was to ensure that the mouse wasn't immunologically sick, it didn't matter how
much of the variable regions you replaced.
However, in those words, “all or any,” was concealed an ambiguity. Did
it mean that for the purposes of working in the invention, all or some unspecified
part of the variable regions had to be replaced—didn't matter how much—or
did it mean that the patent enabled you to replace all or any of the variable
regions, if that enabled you to replace the whole lot? Until the Supreme Court
decision, I think everybody thought it meant the former. It was a patent for a
product, the immunologically healthy mouse, which contained an indeterminate
quantity of human DNA. It wasn't the patent for a mouse with any particular
quantity of human DNA.
Even in the Supreme Court, Lord Briggs said, “True it is that the
particular ground-breaking contribution…is the delivery of a means of
preventing…murine immunological sickness, to which the range of embedded
human variable segments is irrelevant.”10 Nevertheless, he treated the invention
as claiming not only that you should leave the mouse with its constant regions,
but also you're being able to replace the entire range of its variable ones up to
and including all of them.
Now, the specification said nothing about techniques for replacing
segments of DNA. A common general knowledge of the priority date enabled a
8
9

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v. Kymab Ltd [2020] UKSC 27 [14].
Id. at [27]; Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v. Kymab Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 671

[259].
10

Regeneron, [2020] UKSC 27 [22].
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few of the variable segments to be replaced. Lord Briggs treated the claim as
covering any method of replacing all or any of the variable segments. The
authorities on which he relied were those like Exxon Mobil11 and Biogen12 in
which a patentee claims every method of making your product and discloses
only one method of doing so. For that purpose, as construed by Lord Briggs, the
specification was clearly insufficient.
Now, why did the Supreme Court adopt that construction? I think the
clue lies in what Lord Briggs said immediately after having conceded that it
didn't really matter how much of the variable regions one replaced. He went on
to say, “Murine immunological health is not an end in itself. It is a means to a
different end.”13 In other words, may it be all very well for the mice, but what's
it to us? A mouse with only a few variable segments replaced is not much use
for replacing antibodies suitable for humans.
Presumably, Lord Briggs thought, in order to make the patent useful for
human beings, it should be construed as claiming to produce mice with all of
the variable regions replaced. He called this the range of products, all of which
the specification had to enable. I think here the Supreme Court fell into a trap
which is not unknown to supreme courts which consist of judges who have not
been appointed because of their knowledge of patent law. That trap is to import
into one patent concept another where it doesn't belong. Now, it's notorious that
the Supreme Court in the United States has caused considerable confusion by
introducing requirements and novelty into the Section 101 concept of
patentability.14
In Regeneron, Lord Briggs' construction of the claim and his consequent
finding of insufficiency was influenced by the thought that, at the priority date,
it was of little or no practical use. But that's a question which is dealt with
separately in patent law. Article 57 of the European Patent Convention says,
“An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it
can be made or used in any kind of industry.” 15 In Regeneron, no one at any
stage suggested that it wasn't. The patent which the specification must enable is
what that claim identifies as the invention. Here, the invention was a transgenic
mouse, not antibodies for use in humans. Whether such a mouse was capable of
industrial application was a matter for Article 57 not the law of sufficiency.
Where does that leave us? The Supreme Court gave leave to appeal
because the case was thought to raise a question of law. But they misconstrued
the claims, something they might have done better to leave to a Court of Appeal
which had two experienced patent judges. The law remains that the
specification, together with common general knowledge, must enable the
invention to be performed because of the full breadth of the claim. The full
breadth of claim means the extent of the monopoly which the person skilled in
the art would think the language it intended to cover. The Supreme Court held
that the patent was insufficient only because they construed the claim very
differently from the way the skilled person would have done. This conclusion
requires quite a close analysis. I think this case is going to be one of those

11

Exxon/Fuel Oils (T 409/91) EP:BA:1993:T040991.19930318.
Biogen Inc v. Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25 and [1997] RPC 1.
13
Regeneron, [2020] UKSC 27 [22].
14
35 U.S.C. § 101.
15
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, October 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
12
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wrecks in the channel which needs careful navigation until eventually the
Supreme Court declares it officially sunk.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Heinz or Dirk, any comments on this
from the German perspective?
DIRK BÜHLER: I read the decision some time ago so I'm not familiar
at that level of detail which you reported it. It is a trend we see also at the EPO
that assessment of what the actual contribution is and how that should be or can
be mirrored by the claim is one of the central exercises. There is what I perceive
to be a general hesitance to grant or accept broad claims and to really assess the
functional nature of an invention. Whether the principle really works as it is
expressed by the claims, and whether the claims correctly express that principle.
At least under German law, as far as I understand it, we're currently a little bit
more generous. There is a case, the DP4 inhibitor case,16 which looked closely
at what the contribution was. Whether you can use functional claim language to
define your invention and whether a broad monopoly would be justified even if
in some instances there would be non-working embodiments. From that
perspective, I have the impression that currently, in the UK, we see a trend to
push certain issues of plausibility and insufficiency of disclosure where there is
a little bit more of a restrictive approach than we see it in Germany. That is my
general reading of the case law on these issues at the moment.
JOHN RICHARDS: Heinz, any thoughts?
HEINZ GODDAR: I would make the same observation which Dirk has
made already. We think it can be very functional to interpret such a claim which
leads immediately to a problem which Sir Robin has talked about. It means you
have very, very broad claim language if you accept this. Then, the question is
how many potential improvements do you cover by that claim automatically
already? Then the next question is, if it is so broad, what do you have to do to
still leave the opportunity for others, who will work in this hypothetical and
broad rule which the claim covers, to make improvements and to use them?
Then we come to broad experimental use clauses, especially general
ones, like Article 11 no. 2 of the German Patent Act,17 which is much, much
broader than a Bolar Exemption 18 for special circumstances only. To come to
the problem, how can you then as the improver, who makes this improvement,
be sure that you can use commercially what you have invented? A broad claim,
whether this is in AI or in pharma or whatsoever is binding. At the same time,
the freedom for improvers still to do the necessary experiments and to make
further inventions and then commercially to use them should be given. When I
speak later on second medical use patents and compulsory licenses, I’ll try to
dive a little bit deeper into this problem. Thank you.
JOHN RICHARDS: Gustavo, anything from Brazil?
GUSTAVO DE FREITAS MORAIS: Well, I would have many, many
comments about compulsory licensing in Brazil, but I prefer to leave them for
my speech.
JOHN RICHARDS: Okay, all right.
16

BGH, Sept. 11, 2013, X ZB 8/12, juris (Ger.) http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=65657&pos=0&anz=1.
17
Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May 5, 1935, last amended by Gezsetz [G]. April
4, 2016 BGBl I at 558, § 11, no. 2 (Ger.)., https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_patg/englisch_patg.html.
18
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
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SHLOMO COHEN: John, if I may add something?
JOHN RICHARDS: Join in.
SHLOMO COHEN: Thank you. I think the Supreme Court decision is
another example of a problem of methodology and terminology because under
sufficiency, I think some of the judges confused utility and enablement. Those
are two completely separate elements. I think Lennie hit it right on the head by
pointing to the relevant EPO section. The question was confusing. One should
have separated between whether or not the patent at the relevant date could
actually support the invention when you properly interpret the claims. This has
nothing to do with enablement which is teaching.
The other point here is also that I think one thing that the patent world
has yet to face more thoroughly is the question of a pioneering technology.
Pioneering technology cannot be subject to the same mundane patent rules as
any other invention. Problematic issue, just to mention it.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Has anybody got any comments on
Shlomo's contribution about this difference between pioneering inventions and
lesser inventions, which was around when I started off for a long time ago, but
has died in recent years with an attempt to have a more uniform approach to
patent claim scope?
CHRISTOPHER FLOYD: Well, perhaps I could say something. We
used to have an objection called “not fairly based.” That was very much focused
on what is fair protection, given the patentee's contribution to the art. If you
have made a groundbreaking, pioneering, whatever you like to call it, invention,
then you shouldn't be limited to just the particular way in which you have
described that invention being put into effect in your specification, when it can
be clearly seen that the principle that you've invented has wide application.
You don't have to worry about people making improvements and being
stopped and invention being cut down. I take Heinz's point about experimental
use. If somebody makes an important improvement invention, then he's in a
position to do a deal with the patentee and do a cross-licensing deal. That all
works itself out in the wash. There's no problem in having a dominating patent
and then several other patents, if the patentee has genuinely invented a principle
of general application.
JOHN RICHARDS: Is there a risk that you disincentivize people from
seeking to make those improvements if the originator patent is too broad?
CHRISTOPHER FLOYD: Well, it didn't stop Kymab. They managed to
get the whole human gene. Instead of having to pay Regeneron for the use of
their basic idea, they end up getting the whole lot for free, which seems to me
to be completely wrong.
JOHN RICHARDS: Robin, you've got any comments?
ROBIN JACOB: Yes, I too think the case was wrongly decided. It will
have to hang around for some time, unless somebody boldly takes Lennie's line
and say, “Well, they just assumed the construction wrong. This was really
because of their wrong construction. It's just a case on its own about deciding
on the basis of wrong construction of a claim. They paid no attention to it." That
would be a very good idea. I fear it may not happen. Well, not for some time. I
see one attempt has already been made to try and explain it by Colin Birss,
which didn't involve that explanation.
I don't think there's a difference, Shlomo, between pioneering inventions
and smaller inventions. There isn't one rule for one and one for the other, and
9
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we don't need one. I like to take an example of a bicycle. Somebody once
invented the chain drive for the back wheel of a bicycle. All bicycles before
that, you had to pedal around the front wheel; before that they did not have
pedals at all. Somebody thought of that. That covered pretty well all bicycles
ever made thereafter.
Would you say, “Well, you can't have a patent for that" because you've
only been able to enable this rather crude — I think it was called — the safety
bicycle, which came out and it didn't have gears and so on and so forth. It's the
same here. The difference is, as Lennie pointed out, that the trouble was, you
couldn't actually even make a bicycle anybody could ride with Regeneron's
invention here. It's a possible explanation to say, “Yes, it was incapable of
industrial application." That's really what drove the court because they seem to
think that you had to make everything falling within the claim, however
inventive it might be and however many related developments it needed to make
that type of thing. If that was correct it would be very, very dangerous for patent
law and cannot be right. It will not survive. I agree with Lennie. The thing will
be removed from the channel by people whose job it is to remove rubbish from
the lanes of traffic.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Okay, let's move on. Dirk, you're on.
DIRK BÜHLER: Thanks.
JOHN RICHARDS: SPCs.19 We just got it down to one presentation this
year instead of an entire session as we've done in previous years.
DIRK BÜHLER: All right. I think as everybody knows, SPCs are
Europe's counterpart to patent term extensions in the United States. They're of
course different because they're not extending a patent, they're an adjunct to an
existing patent connected to an authorized product, which means you have a
triangle of the patent, the SPC, and the active which in itself is a complex setup
that might explain some of the difficulties we see in the case law. What I want
to report on is a decision which was handed down by the European Court of
Justice roughly about one and a half years ago, the Royalty Pharma decision.20
I must declare a conflict here or an interest, better to say, because I represented
Royalty Pharma in that case.
The case is on Article 3(a) of the regulation,21 which stipulates that in
order to get an SPC, which prolongs your exclusivity by five years from which
the active is authorized, it must be protected by a basic patent. This provision
has been hotly debated. It's been subject to a couple of decisions before the
European Court of Justice. While a lot of people had hoped that there would be
some clarity from the Royalty Pharma decision, and I think there may, I think
it also will in some respect create more confusion.
To give a brief bit of background here, and I think this ties in with some
of the aspects that Sir Robin has already mentioned, Royalty Pharma acquired
the patent and the original patentee had identified a new use for an already
existing class of actives, which was called DP-422 inhibitors. The patentee

19

Supplementary protection certificate.
Case C-650/17, Royalty Pharma Collection Tr. v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt,
2020 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CJ0650 (Apr. 30, 2020).
21
Regulation Concerning the Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal
Products (EC) No. 469/2009 of 6 May 2009, art. 3(a), 2009 O.J. (L 152) 1.
22
Dipeptidyl Peptidase 4.
20
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showed by a couple of cleverly designed examples that if you inhibit a certain
enzyme, you will be able to treat diabetes.
The claim was broad as far as the actives were concerned because they
were functionally defined, but it was narrow as regards to the indication. The
value of that patent is that this indication was the first authorized use for that
group of actives. What happened was that the invention was made in academia,
a company was founded, they did the preclinical work, early clinical work, and
then partnered with big pharma, which in this case was the American Merck.
Merck didn't find that the original compounds were good, so it set up its
own screen. They had licensed the project, so they were a licensee of the patent,
and identified another DP-4 inhibitor. But they had started the project to identify
DP-4 inhibitors for the treatment of diabetes. Merck got the compound patent
and their SPC. Royalty Pharma, who had acquired the patent from the original
patentee, was now trying to also get an SPC for Sitagliptin, which is possible
under the SPC regulation.
If you think about it, you had an innovator who started the work, which
opened the door to that indication for this type of active. They're a cooperating
company who then developed the drug. I think you can see scenarios why that
would make sense, that both of the parties who actually contributed to the
development of this new treatment can participate through SPCs.
What the European Court of Justice ruled here was that Sitagliptin, the
active, was not protected by the earlier patent. Now, there was no debate that
Sitagliptin had been developed later. But there was also no question that
Sitagliptin had been developed in order to be a DP-4 inhibitor and in order to be
used for treatment of diabetes. It was not an accidental overlap.
The reasoning of the European Court of Justice was that it is not
protected because it is not specifically identifiable. They said it's not specifically
identifiable because it's protected by a later-filed compound patent.23 So, you
have the earlier-use patent and you have the later-filed compound patent. The
dependent patent, if you want to say, was taken as evidence that the active was
not protected by the earlier basic patent.
I think what this decision shows is, first of all, that the European Court
of Justice in my opinion continues to mix different concepts of patent law by
sticking to established terminology. I think in the context of the extent of patent
protection, they're mixing aspects of sufficiency of disclosure and of original
disclosure.
What I take from this decision is that I think it's clarifying that the
European Court of Justice wants the active to be disclosed in the patent as
precisely as possible. While I think that clarity is welcome, I think it will create
some more cases, and probably referrals, in the future because this idea that a
later-filed patent proves that you were not in possession of the active by the
earlier patent will undermine a lot of filing strategies which have been
developed in the past where you, for example, have a broad generic Markush
claim24 and then later your selection invention.
What you also see is that a lot of the cases that the European Court of
Justice had in the past couple of years were concerned with situations where
innovators were having disputes with generics. Now, suddenly you see the
23
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extent of protection question swinging to the other end of the spectrum and it's
a question suddenly between the early movers and their corporation partners.
That I think puts into focus the issue of what you do with these dominating
patents that open up the door for a new therapeutic field, for a new class of
actives, be it the checkpoint inhibitors which revolutionized cancer patients, or
be it RNAi25 therapeutics where the breakthrough was made 20 years ago and
now the drugs are making it to the market.
What I take from that is we're getting some clarity. I think we're also
getting uncertainty. But I think we're losing sight a little bit of whether the
purpose of the regulation is achieved to actually foster innovation. What I think
the question for the panel is that if there won't be any new legislation on SPCs
in Europe in the foreseeable future, then how can one engage in a discussion
with a court to really look at the national practice and how these concepts have
developed in order to bring this into alignment. We don't see a unification or a
unifying effect at the moment. I think the patchwork is getting worse across
Europe and not better.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. That does tie into some extent with
what we were talking about earlier about the best ways to deal with situations
where you have abroad initial invention and then improvements on it, and to
provide the incentive for producing these improvements. Does anybody want to
say anything on Dirk before we go into Heinz? Robin?
ROBIN JACOB: I am the judge who referred Neurim26 to the Court of
Justice. I thought it was such an obvious case for SPC that it was astonishing
that Richard Arnold thought it was that clear the other way. I'll just remind you
of the facts. The prior patent was owned by a different patentee and had
proposed using this substance as helping the fertility of sheep through a pill
which you inserted in the ear of the ewe.
The human medical use was quite unrelated to that. It was a new
invention. The Court of Justice got it right.27 Although they now say they got it
wrong.28 I said in my judgment that if there wasn't an SPC for this, the system
wasn't fit for purpose. 29 I'm afraid the Court of Justice is making the system not
fit for purpose. Dirk is absolutely right, they've forgotten the purpose of this
thing.
It's more serious than that because they haven't a clue about patents.
They don't understand that a patent claim may have within it other things which
have not been invented yet. They don't understand any of that. They don't
understand patent claims at all. They are living proof of the fact that the UPC 30
was correctly devised as a court so that the Court of Justice should not have
jurisdiction over patents and they shouldn't be doing SPCs at all.
I'm sorry, that's my beef about it. The consequence is going to be quite
significant. Many important pharma patents, inventions will not get a proper
reward and that is not good for humanity. Otherwise, I agree with them.
25
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JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Shlomo, any comments from Israel on
that?
SHLOMO COHEN: Yes, just that a solution to some of the problems
that we've come up against here is compulsory cross-licensing between the
pioneering patent and the down-the-line applications, or selection patents, or
whatever you want to call them. The Israeli statute has such a compulsory
license requirement, 31 which is not very clear and perhaps is done wrongly.
Clearly, this should be the solution, which by the way may in various instances
also occur simply because the parties should have an interest in it.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you, of course, a compulsory licensing
solution will not go down well in the United States. Do we have anybody in the
in the participants who wants to speak from the U.S. point of view on this? Any
other comments from the panel?
GUSTAVO DE FREITAS MORAIS: John, can I make a quick comment
from the Brazilian perspective?
JOHN RICHARDS: Of course.
GUSTAVO DE FREITAS MORAIS: Apparently, Brazilian law copied
the Israeli law concerning compulsory licensing for dependent patents. Shlomo,
I have to say, every day I thank God because no one has ever tried these sorts
of compulsory license. If this spread out, I think it would be a nightmare and
would seriously affect the patent system because, in Brazil, there are maybe tens
of thousands of situations where you have a senior patent and junior patents. I
think we should use this remedy with lots of caution.
JOHN RICHARDS: Of course, TRIPS32 does provide for compulsory
licensing in cases where the second invention is of major importance as
compared to the first. I think this was put in to counter what was happening in
Japan back in the seventies and eighties with patent flooding, where people were
having minor secondary inventions and demanding cross-licenses from the
primary patent owner.
GUSTAVO DE FREITAS MORAIS: The problem in Brazil is we don't
have these requirements about being a major improvement. It's just a dependent
patent.
JOHN RICHARDS: Juergen, please.
JUERGEN DRESSEL: I want to return to this SPC presentation by Dirk.
I understand your anger coming from the patentee's perspective, but I think
Royalty Pharma brought some welcomed clarity. It is really, really clear now
that unless you've specified your product in the patent, you will not get an SPC.
I think we should remember what the SPC was for. It was mainly supposed to
compensate for the development time of a specific product.
Actually, the European SPC and how the case law developed was very,
very special compared to other countries where patent extensions and SPCs
were granted. In other countries, it was impossible to get third-party SPCs. I
think this Royalty Pharma decision will really eliminate third-party SPCs. You
actually had a real maze of SPCs granted in Europe. I think a patentee, like
Royalty Pharma or its predecessor, was entitled to actually have a dominating
31
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patent right and get money licenses during that time. I also could not understand
why they should get actually the extra five years for the SPC for that purpose.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Any other comments on that?
DIRK BÜHLER: Can I just have one comment on that?
JOHN RICHARDS: Of course.
DIRK BÜHLER: Juergen, I see the point on the clarity about the
disclosure of the active, no question about that. The problem or the issue that
troubles me is taking later-filed patents, which by definition are based on an
inventive step, as an indication that the active was not specifically identifiable
in the earlier patent. I think there are a lot of situations out there where you have
an earlier patent and patent offices and courts would say that is a specific enough
disclosure to give rise to an SPC.
Then there is a later selection patent and you will see challenges for the
earlier patents. That connection worries me because it's mixing concepts of
patent law, which shouldn't be dealt with under the extent of protection proviso
of Article 3(a). If they don't like third-party SPCs, they should say so. But they
should not use the extent of protection proviso, which is one of the most
fundamental terms in patent law, to deal with other issues.
I think that has repercussions that are not foreseeable. I think that would
also hurt companies that take the drugs through the clinic. This argument you
see, that they should profit for their dominating patent in the beginning—I don't
know. These are really door-openers that open access of new treatments. I think
for this type of situation, given the contribution and because they have entered
contracts, I could see an argument why they should also profit from the drugs
that were made.
JUERGEN DRESSEL: John, if I may make one comment. I think you're
right. This will create severe issues between genus patents and selection
inventions. I can imagine, for example in the biological field, when you talk
about antibodies or things like that, it's actually quite difficult to get valid
selection inventions. It can be difficult, and where the originator might have
made the choice earlier, before this case law, that they actually take their genus
patent because it's more valid. And now they might actually lose both. They
might lose the selection invention, because it's obvious or who knows what, and
they might lose the SPC based on the genus patent because it's not specified
according to the SPC regulation.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. I think I think we've done SPCs. Heinz,
you're on.
HEINZ GODDAR: Thank you so much. First of all, I feel a little bit lost
of course. I'm a physicist, and I'm not a pharmacologist or chemist even. As to
SPCs, I know how to spell them, and I know that they are used widely but that's
all I know about them.
My idea to talk about something like second medical use patents and
compulsory use licenses has a history. Two years ago, in China, I was with
Klaus Bacher, now Presiding Judge of the 10th Senate of the German Supreme
Court. We talked about artificial intelligence systems and problems they might
cause with regard to two aspects. What are they? Are they just tools? Then we
might have to think about reach-through [unintelligible] claims for inventions,
like AI, creating a situation wherein, for example, by use of an AI-system new
turbine blades based on flight data of millions of flights are developed. Then, if
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you now use such an AI-system in order to develop other inventions, like
improving tire-supports in a car, can you do this or can you not do this?
The general agreement among Chinese scholars, Dr. Bacher, and me on
the above-mentioned occasion, has been that we have already in the old good
patent system —where also Sir Robin was aiming at— solutions that might be
useful for modern problems. This is, first of all, the broad experimental-use
clause which can be used to do research on something which has been patented.
By doing so, certain new things can be legitimately developed. This does not
only apply to pharma world, but also to technical, communications and software
items. Now, the next question is how one possibly can make sure that such
improvements, legitimately developed by exercising the rights under a general
experimental-use-clause, can be commercially used.
In this regard, I had the pleasure––not too long ago —to participate again
in a virtual —unfortunately, so it must have been last year —conference which
Sir Robin guided in England. Also Dr. Bacher was there again, and we discussed
later a little bit of the aforementioned question. I had in this discussion to do
with general patents on improvements in pharma, be it just modified substance
patents or be it second medical use patents. Furthermore, I have discussed with,
[unintelligible], a close Indian friend of mine, Lakshmi Kumaran, whether there
might not be a possibility to give access to such patents on improvements by the
use of compulsory cross-licensing provisions embedded in many patent laws,
like in Article 24(2) of the German Patent Act. 33 All this could solve the
problems of giving access to improvements (second-medical-uses) also in
pharma.
Let's look at what a patent of improvement could be in pharma: You can
first think of somebody who modifies a certain substance which is already
known or patented even for a first medical use. You modify it in such a manner
that it is better suitable for that purpose. You can also do something else, you
can make a patent of improvement out of it, you patent it of course, and hereby
you develop a second medical use patent, which is patented.
Now, what do we have to do then in order to incentivize research in that
direction? How can we make sure that what has been—by innovation, by
inventive activities, whether it is in AI or in pharma research—developed can
be commercially used? There I look into German patent law. I'm very happy to
hear from Shlomo that in Israel you have a similar thing, as I learned today, that
you have in Brazil, which corresponds exactly to Article 24(2) in German patent
law. That provision gives, interesting enough, in Germany, a very special kind
of a compulsory license.

“Where a licence seeker cannot exploit an invention for which he holds protection
under a patent with a later filing or priority date without infringing a patent with an earlier filing
or priority date, he shall be entitled, in respect of the proprietor of the patent with the earlier
filing or priority date, to the grant of a compulsory licence from the proprietor of the patent if
1. the condition under subsection (1) no. 1 is fulfilled, and 2. his own invention demonstrates
an important technological advance of substantial economic significance compared to that of
the patent with the earlier filing or priority date. The proprietor of the patent can require the
licence seeker to grant him a cross-licence on reasonable terms and conditions for the use of the
patented invention with the later filing or priority date.” Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], May
5, 1935, last amended by Gezsetz [G]. April 4, 2016 BGBl I at 558, § 24, no. 2 (Ger.).,
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Insofar, we have Article 24(1)34 of German patent law, which is the usual
compulsory license where you need to check public interest in making a
patented good available, if a voluntary license by a newcomer cannot get from
the patentee of the primary or dominant patent. In the situation discussed here,
however, we have to look at Article 24(2) of the German Patent Act, which
explicitly—and you can read this in the materials how this article was been
developed in German law—does not require checking any public interest.
Rather, it is generally accepted that something which is an important
technical progress—that is the definition in the law—of high economic
importance is developed and you have patented this, then you are entitled in a
very special kind of a compulsory license. It's the exact thing Shlomo
mentioned. In a compulsory cross-license, that cross-license does not come for
free. Rather, the conditions of the cost of the license, which may accompany the
cross-license must be determined like in Germany by the Federal Patent Court,
the famous or infamous one. We all know that Federal Patent Court from
bifurcation procedures and injunctions, of course. [unintelligible].
First of all, let's discuss, in this context, the improvement of, say, a
second medical use patent. If you get that patent, you have already proven that
a technical progress has been achieved, because if the second medical use
“innovation” would not be technical, it would not be patentable. Now, whether
it is important and whether it is of high economic value, has to be determined
by an institution authorized to do so, which in Germany is the Federal Patent
Court, who then decides whether a compulsory cross-license should be given.
If it is given, it does not mean at all that this should be cost-free i.e. that
the dominant patent owner and the secondary patent owner would be able to use
the patent improvement, secondary patent, or second medical use patent for free.
There can be, and regularly will be—although we have not a single decision in
Germany on this provision and it has never been used—a balancing payment
between the dominant (primary) and the secondary patent owner in order to take
care of the different merits and importance of the two inventions, i.e. the
primary one and the secondary one. We have, in other words, to determine the
value of the two.
This could be a way to make second medical use patents more attractive
to obtain and also to use the patented invention for the benefit of mankind. Then
you can make sure that the improved product really can, without using ordinary
courts, and without looking into the sometimes strange or difficult-tounderstand case law, at least in Germany, concerning second medical use patent,
under what conditions the person or party or company who has made the
improvement or second medical use invention can use the invention. You do
not have to care about this in civil courts, rather this all can be done in a more
neutral institution, namely a patent-office-like body, which is the Federal Patent
Court. There you have technical people essentially supported by legally-trained
judges who will decide on this. Then, there's an appeal to the German Federal
Court of Justice (“Supreme Court”) again.
“The non-exclusive authorisation to commercially use an invention shall be granted
by the Federal Patent Court in an individual case in accordance with the following provisions
(compulsory licence) where 1. a licence seeker has, within a reasonable period of time,
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain permission from the proprietor of the patent to use the
invention on reasonable commercial terms and conditions, and 2. the public interest calls for the
grant of a compulsory licence.” Id. at § 24, no. 1.
34
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So, I am claiming that a combination of a generous experimental use
clause and a look at the compulsory cross-licensing possibilities, which by the
way exist in India, in Russia, and in Greater China––that means both in Taiwan
and in the People's Republic of China––would be much easier to use in order to
make second medical use patents useful. By this I mean that one can make use
of them in the interest of mankind without having to go into usually very
expensive and lengthy court procedures. All this could be done inside a patentoffice-like body at least.
This is all I wanted to talk about, namely to encourage everybody to look
at similar provisions which also are found in TRIPS, of course, and which in
Germany are codified at least in Article 24(2) of German patent law. No public
interest will be checked, not at all. It is just in order to make improved articles,
like second medical use patents, and all the inventions underlying them,
available to mankind. That's all. Not cost-free, but together with a balanced
payment stream between secondary and primary or dominant patent owners.
Thank you very much. That's it.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you, Heinz. I think actually similar
provisions do exist in many other laws beyond those that you've articulated. I
don't think they've really ever been used anywhere. Has anybody got any
thoughts on that as to why they have not been used?
HEINZ GODDAR: Actually, I don't understand it. I can’t tell you why
not. Because reasonable people, as we all see in practice when we go into
licensing, will agree voluntarily on a reasonable deal, in the sense of the former
U.S. President, how in the best interest of both parties to make these improved
products available. Usually, big pharma has a problem, if I may say so, and
according to my experiences, the pipeline for new products is running out.
Protection is ending somewhere.
There is a need and a desire even to have possibilities to bring improved
products into the market for different medical uses for that. There is a big
incentive to negotiate, and I think the pure reason why this is never used—in
Germany and also in India, although they are starting now— is that they first
have to solve the problem, particularly in the interest of domestic industry, that
second medical use patents are not achievable in India, which at the moment is
not the case.
There, they're starting now to think about whether this is a good idea or
a bad idea. It is already voluntarily used. But like compulsory licensing
according to Article 24(1) of German Patent Act, the provision of Article 24(2)
of German Patent Act has practically never been used in reality. We had two or
three cases early last year and a case in 1996, which was something that then
was settled during the appeal procedure at the Federal Supreme Court. We never
had anything which became practically a guidance in compulsory licensing
discussions in Germany.
People are much more reasonable than we think. I think the state
(“government”) must always have a possibility, if parties, against reasonability
whatsoever, do not agree that it can be made sure that improved products will
be made available to the consumer and will be available to the public, et cetera.
I think the reason, dear John, is simply the reason for the legislator to have such
a provision as discussed above is available in case that the parties in question
are not reasonable. Then there should be a possibility to bring them by force, to
compel them, to force them, to agree and to come to a solution which makes
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good products that have been developed as second medical use patented
products available to mankind.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. Anybody else want to make any
comment on that? Robin, Christopher, Dr. Hoffman?
SHLOMO COHEN: One quick comment if I may. On the problem of
actually connecting Robin's original comments and Heinz now, very often you
can patent a second medical use in one way or another. The only problem is in
many jurisdictions that I'm familiar with, you cannot get a patent term extension
or an SPC because an SPC or PTE35 will be granted only to a compound that
has been registered in the regulatory register for the first time.
With improvement patent later on with a second medical use, the
compound has already been registered in the regulatory register and it would be
difficult. This is a disincentive. One should consider amending the patent term
extension laws to accommodate this.
HEINZ GODDAR: If I may immediately reply, I didn't know this. I'm
not an SPC specialist, but I think this would be an obvious measure to improve
in order to make this compulsory cross-licensing, balanced cross-licensing
provision also available for SPCs. I think it would make a lot of sense.
JOHN RICHARDS: Thank you. I think we do, because of time, need to
move on. Gustavo, you're going to bring us up to date on Brazil?
GUSTAVO DE FREITAS MORAIS: Okay. Well, thank you very much.
I have some comments about enforcements of patents in general, specifically
pharmaceutical patents in this country. First of all, as I already mentioned in the
previous panel, we have a bifurcated system in Brazil. Infringement lawsuits
are filed and prosecuted before state courts and invalidity lawsuits prosecuted
before the federal courts.
In general, the venue of the federal court in Rio de Janeiro is used in
order to invalidate a patent, because the Brazilian Patent Office is located there.
One also has to designate the Brazilian PTO36 as a co-defendant in such cases.
But there are some invalidity lawsuits filed before other federal courts in this
country. In general, talking about infringement specifically, maybe one of the
key issues is to line up expert opinions.
Most if not all patent infringement lawsuits in this country will include
a preliminary injunction request in the very same petition. I would say that in
more than 50 percent of the infringement lawsuits, a preliminary injunction is
granted either at first instance or after an interlocutory appeal. We understand
that it is very important to have those expert opinions. The more concise and
effective those expert opinions are, the more chance of getting a preliminary
injunction. One more issue about expert opinions: it's very important to get a
Brazilian expert. I know that there are some very renowned international experts
in given technical areas, but it is always our advice to get a local expert and if
possible from the same state where the lawsuit is running.
Maybe a few comments on venue. There are some courts that tend to be
more favorable to patents. Maybe one thing that has to be weighed, especially
with regards to pharmaceutical patents, is that the federal courts in Rio de
Janeiro may not be the more sympathetic ones for pharmaceutical patents. That
is one thing that has to be considered.
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We have doctrine of equivalents included in the law not as a case law
construction. I would say that almost all of the infringement lawsuits that I
represented as an attorney were based on the doctrine of equivalents,37
especially in cases of formulation patents. In general, there is always a
difference with the formulation of the defendants, but this article in the law
regarding doctrine of equivalents can be as a rule very handy.
A final comment regarding secondary patents. I see that some
stakeholders tend to rely a lot on the composition of matter patents. I agree with
that, but sometimes there is no composition of matter valid in Brazil. Sometimes
they have not even be filed in Brazil. However, sometimes there are other
secondary patents, such as those covering formulations, crystalline forms,
particle size, and so forth.
I always tend to recommend that if possible, and if there is a case of
infringement, to use those patents. In many cases we have been quite successful.
Besides enforcement, if I still have more time, I would like to address the
elephant in the room, i.e., the fact that in Brazil we have a very special rule
concerning patent term calculation. It is either 20 years from filing or 10 years
from grant, whichever expires later.
This rule is now subject to a constitutional challenge, which is a very
special lawsuit that is filed directly at the Brazilian Supreme Court.38 The
judgment has been scheduled for last Wednesday and it did not take place. It
should be noted that the main federal prosecutor that filed this constitutional
challenge in the first place requested one month ago a preliminary injunction on
the challenge. On Wednesday evening after the session that did not entertain the
constitutional challenge, the reporting justice granted this preliminary
injunction. The situation right now is the following: any patents granted in this
country, until there is a final en banc decision about this preliminary injunction,
will have only the term of 20 years for filing. Every Tuesday, the Brazilian PTO
decides on a number of patent applications and publishes its decisions. We will
be keen to see next Tuesday what the Brazilian PTO’s President will do with
those patents. The en banc decision or judgment is scheduled for next
Wednesday. We will probably have news from Brazil next week. Thank you.
JOHN RICHARDS: I think we're more or less out of time. Has anybody
got any last comments or thoughts they want to add? In which case, I thank you
all. I hope you've enjoyed the session. I have enjoyed it. I look forward to seeing
you hopefully live at Fordham next year. Thank you.
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